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Introduction 
[1] The focus of this paper is the right to freedom of religion in 
multi-religious societies. In particular it looks at some of the legal 
issues of the impact of parallel legal systems on the fundamental 
right to enjoy individual religious freedom and to lead varied lives as 
well as the responsibility to respect the rights of others to live as 
they choose according to their faiths. My aim is to explain and 
create a deeper understanding of some of the important legal 
issues and the growing challenges of legal pluralism and religious 
diversity in contemporary Malaysia and Britain. 
[2] Even though the constitutional history, the religious 
demography and the legal setting of both countries are very 
different yet to a certain extent they both face similar challenges in 
the quest to build a more just and cohesive society in a multi-racial 
and multi-faith democracy.  Life in both of the countries is based on 
common core values, which include rule of law, respect, and 
tolerance of different faiths.  It is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, to examine comprehensively at all legal issues that arise 
in a multi-religious society.  However it is hoped that this paper may 
shed some light of some of the broader issues around religious 
freedom within a multi-religious societies. 
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[3] In the domestic setting as well as at the international level 
religious freedom has always been one of the most contentious of 
fundamental liberties. We live in a world today where religious 
diversity is a reality that many contemporary societies are forced to 
deal with. When multiple religious views exist side by side, 
differences are bound to occur and it can be the root causes of 
disharmony. One of the root causes of disharmony is discrimination 
as well as marginalization in its many forms and facets.  
[4] It is against this background that the following questions are 
always being asked: How can a society effectively accommodate 
multiple and sometimes competing worldviews within its midst, 
while at the same time upholding social cohesion and harmony?  Is 
it possible to allow religious groups the complete freedom to 
reaffirm their identity and practice their diverse rituals and traditions, 
without leading to resentment and conflict within the society? To 
what extent is the religious freedom of minorities protected in multi-
religious societies?  These are some of the challenges confronting a 
multi-faith democracy. At the heart of this is the need in a 
democratic society to reconcile the interests and respect the beliefs 
of the population as a whole.  Balancing the diverse interests in 
such a multi-faith democracy can be enormously challenging.  And 
so one of the biggest challenges facing multi-societies is how to 
deal with diversity.  
Malaysia:  A Multi-religious Society 
[5] Let me first explain these challenges by reference to my own 
jurisdiction of Malaysia, which is a multi-cultural and multi-religious 
society. As of 1.1.2015, the population was estimated to be 30 
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million people, the majority of whom are Muslims (60%) with the 
remainder being Buddhists (19%), Christians (9%), Hindus (6.3%) 
and others living side by side. We have a parallel legal system in 
which the sharia legal system exists alongside the civil legal system. 
[6] Malaysia as a nation has always been able to showcase itself 
as a living thriving role model founded on the experience of 
moderation and pluralism among the people of various races and 
religion.  It is a land where many faiths and ethnicities freely prosper 
and thrive.1 Diversity has always been its way of life. As a nation, 
we have attempted to embrace a more pluralistic approach in our 
treatment of cultural and religious groups, rather than the 
assimilation methodology.  
[7] Although it has been said that religion has been a divisive 
force in society, peaceful co-existence has always been its way of 
life. But the reality is that Malaysia’s diversity brings obvious 
challenges and inherent difficulties. Although there has been 
religious harmony and tolerance for a very long time, a number of 
controversial issues have emerged which undermined religious ties 
between the different religious groups during recent years and 
raises difficult practical issues and challenge of legal pluralism. 
Over the years, the country has seen incidents of intolerance. 
[8] Our courts are also on a regular basis confronted with the 
questions of how to deal with religiously related disputes. In 
particular, there was a long and protracted legal tussle between 
religious authorities and a Catholic’s organization over the word 
“Allah”. More recently, the issues of constitutionality of 
criminalization of conduct on the basis of religion and legislation 
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governing faith have generated much intense debate. There is then 
the recurring case surrounding the unilateral conversion of a child 
by one parent who has converted to Islam.  And the ensuing tussle 
over the custody of the child between the disputing parents in the 
civil court and the sharia court cannot have passed unnoticed. 
Some of these strictly legal issues have, unfortunately, been much 
politicized and dominated the political scene.  Events and issues 
like this have pushed the question to the sharp end of the debate. 
[9] Against a backdrop of these controversies, Malaysia’s identity 
has become a topic of much debate in recent years.  The 
complexity of a parallel sharia legal system that exists alongside the 
civil justice system loomed large when clashing jurisdictions every 
now and then left disputing parties with no straightforward answers 
to their sensitive legal disputes. 
  
[10] As we shall see, overlaps and inherent conflicts not only 
occurred in a parallel court system but also on multi-legislature 
arrangement.  I would venture to say that when the makers of the 
Federal Constitution provide a parallel system of law, no one could 
have foreseen that it would result in these controversies.  Little did 
the makers envisage those caught in between the civil and sharia 
dichotomy. 
[11] Let me give you a brief historical background and the legal 
setting that have led to the present-day position so that you can 
understand its distinctiveness. 
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Constitutional Position 
[12] Malaysia is a federation and has a written constitution, which 
is the supreme law of the land.  The doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament does not apply and the power of the federal parliament 
and of state legislatures is limited by the Federal Constitution.2 Any 
action or decision of government or any law passed by any 
legislatures, which is inconsistent with the Federal Constitution, is 
void to the extent of such inconsistency.  Azlan Shah FJ (as His 
Royal Highness then was) when delivering the judgment of the 
Federal Court in Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia 
[1977] 2 M.L.J. 187 said:  
“The Constitution is not a mere collection of pious platitudes.  
It is the supreme law of the land embodying three basic 
concepts: One of them is that the individual has certain 
fundamental rights upon which not even the power of the 
State may encroach. The second is the distribution of 
sovereign power between the States and the Federation, 
that the 13 States shall exercise sovereign power in local 
matters and the nation in matters affecting the country at 
large. The third is that no single man or body shall exercise 
complete sovereign power, but that it shall be distributed 
among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of 
Government, compendiously expressed in modern terms 
that we are a government of laws, not of men.” 
[13] It is the corner stone of our social order and the symbol of 
national unity. 3 Despite its colonial origins and its continually 
disputed interpretation and relevance, the Federal Constitution has 
achieved, due to its longevity and in spite of its colonial origins, a 
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status quite rare in the contemporary world – that of an 
autochthonous constitution.4 The Federal Constitution exemplifies 
clear essential values that were held dearly by the founding fathers. 
The social contract is a salient characteristic of the Malaysian 
Constitution. It forms the substratum of the Constitution, which 
provides strength to the country.  On this, in 2003 Sultan Azlan 
Shah stated:  
“We embarked on a journey as a constitutional democracy 
with the full realization that we were a multi-racial people 
with different languages, cultures and religion. Our inherent 
differences had to be accommodated into a constitutional 
framework that recognized the traditional features of Malay 
society with the Sultanate system at the apex as a distinct 
feature of the Malaysian Constitution. Thus there was 
produced in August 1957 a unique document without any 
parallel anywhere. It adopted the essential features of the 
Westminster model and built into it the traditional features of 
Malay society. This Constitution reflected a social contract 
between the multi-racial peoples of our country.” 
“It is fundamental in this regard that the Federal Constitution 
is the supreme law of the land and constitutes the 
grundnorm to which all other laws are subject. This essential 
feature of the Federal Constitution ensures that the social 
contract between the various races of our country embodied 
in the independence Constitution of 1957 is safeguarded and 
forever enures to the Malaysian people as a whole, for their 
benefit.” 5 
[14] The Constitution adopts a federal character that stipulates for 
a federal system. The system establishes duality of government 
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consisting of a strong federal government at the center and state 
governments at the state level enjoying a measure of autonomy.  
[15] The crucial element in this system is the division of legislative 
and executive powers between the federal and state governments. 
The Constitution outlines the scope of the legislative powers of the 
federal and state governments by referring to three lists, the Federal 
List, the State List and the Concurrent List.6 
[16] The division of federal and state executive powers follows the 
division of legislative powers; the executive authority of the federal 
government extends to all matters where the parliament may make 
laws and the executive authority of a state extends to all matters 
where the state legislature may make laws.  
[17] The Constitution also outlines the scope of the judicial powers.  
Though a federation, Malaysia’s court system is principally federal 
in nature.  Among others, civil and criminal law along with the 
administration of justice are placed under the jurisdiction of the 
federal government while Islamic law and the administration of 
sharia courts under the jurisdiction of the respective state 
governments.  
[18] Indeed, legal pluralism in Malaysia is mirrored by the dual 
parallel courts system of civil and sharia that co-exists side by side. 
It is somewhat a unique and complicated arrangement because two 
different but unequal levels of government are administering the two 
systems separately. 
[19] As a matter of broad general rule, the civil courts being courts 
of general jurisdiction administer laws, which are of general 
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application, namely legislature passed by the federal parliament and 
the common laws and rules of equity.  Whereas, the sharia courts, 
which operates outside the civil system administer the sharia family 
and sharia criminal enactments passed by the respective state 
legislatures. The sharia courts, which predated the civil court 
system, do not have jurisdiction where one of the parties involved is 
a non-Muslim. 
[20]  Prior to 1988, the sharia courts did not have exclusive 
jurisdiction as the civil courts had power to review and quite 
regularly reviewed, the decisions of the sharia courts by certiorari, 
which in the process had overturned the decisions of the sharia 
courts. There were instances where civil courts entertained 
applications that sought to re-adjudicate matters that sharia court 
had determined.7 There was also a case where the civil court had 
applied laws of general application, which are contrary to Islamic 
law.8 
[21] In 1988, a new clause was added to the Constitution, which 
provides that the civil courts shall have no jurisdiction with respect 
to matters within the jurisdiction of the sharia courts. The 
amendment was made in order to avoid the conflict between the 
decisions of the sharia courts and civil courts, to give the sharia 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to Islamic law, to 
protect the integrity and enhance the status of the sharia courts and 
to free the sharia courts from interference by the civil courts.  
[22] The amendment was to prevent the civil court from exercising 
its powers of judicial review over decisions of the sharia court.9 It 
would appear that the amendment is clear-cut but in reality nothing 
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is straightforward. In fact, the very question whether a matter is 
within the jurisdiction of the sharia courts can be a contested issue 
thus giving rise to the issue of jurisdiction and casting doubt on the 
efficacy of the new clause in ensuring that the sharia courts enjoy 
exclusive jurisdiction over sharia matters.10 
[23] Despite its obvious challenges and inherent practical 
difficulties, the existence of a dual legal system has no doubt 
enriched the legal jurisprudence of the country.11 
 
Place and Role of Religion 
[24] Malaysian legal history can be traced back to the beginning of 
the 15th century.  Historically, religion played a significant role in the 
development of the nation’s legal system. Sharia law was generally 
applied and in fact practiced in the Malay States.12 
[25] In the later part of the 18th century, the British came and ever 
since the colonial rule has had a most important impact on the legal 
development of this country with the introduction of common law, 
rules of equity and their legal as well as judicial system. The attitude 
of the British towards Islam and local customs was one of extreme 
caution and not to intervene in all matters related to Islam or even 
local customs and traditions. The British judges recognized sharia 
law, as the law of the land.13 Interestingly, legislations on sharia 
criminal law were introduced during the British administration.  This 
is very evident in the numerous legislations enacted that contained 
matrimonial offences as well as offences relating to religious belief 
and faith, including apostasy and conversion to Islam.14 
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[26] It can be said that during the period of colonization, Muslims 
were not deprived of practicing sharia laws although it had resulted 
in its marginalization.  During the colonial period, sharia law was 
applicable only as family law. However, some aspect of sharia 
criminal law operated side by side with the English style of 
administration of criminal justice. Thus, Malaysia’s dual judicial 
system of civil and religious is a product of colonialism, which 
introduced a secular order, substantively restricting sharia law to 
personal or private law.15 There can be no doubt that sharia  law 
would have ended by becoming the law of Malaya had British law 
not stepped in to check, as the British relegated sharia law primarily 
to personal matters.16 Concerning the place and role of religion, the 
Constitution essentially entrenched the position that had applied 
under British rule.17 As a result, Islam remained influential in the 
public life and the administration of justice in Malaysia.  The 
Constitution treatment of religion is a fundamental defining element 
in Malaysia’s multicultural and multi-religious environment. In 1976 
Parliament amended the Constitution. It substituted, inter-alia, the 
expression “Muslim”, “Muslim religion” and “Muslim court” wherever 
it appears in the Constitution, with the word “Islamic”, “religion of 
Islam” and “Sharia courts”.18 
[27] There has been included in the Federal Constitution a 
declaration that Islam is the religion of the Federation but other 
religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the 
Federation.  Every person has the right to profess and practice his 
own religion and the right to propagate his religion, though this last 
right is subject to any restrictions imposed by state law relating to 
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the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons 
professing the Muslim religion. 
[28] The position of Islam as the religion of the Federation imposes 
certain obligation on the government to promote and defend Islam 
as well to protect its sanctity.19 The recognition of state religion in 
the supreme law of the land upholds the significant position of 
religion in the legal realm and the religious character of this nation. 
Islam, a religion that embraces diversity, is recognized as one of the 
basic features of the Constitution but at the same time it does not 
establish the nation as a theocratic country.20 So for more than fifty 
years, secular and Islamic traditions have shared a co-existence 
that permitted Malaysia to modernize and democratize.21 
[29] The Supreme Court in the case of Che Omar bin Che Soh v 
Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 55 took the position that it was 
the intention of the framers of the Federal Constitution that the word 
'Islam' in article 3(1) be given a restrictive meaning, substantively 
restricting sharia law to personal or private law. The Supreme Court 
said: 
“There can be no doubt that Islam is not just a mere 
collection of dogmas and rituals but it is a complete way of 
life covering all fields of human activities, may they be 
private or public, legal, political, economic, social, cultural, 
moral or judicial. This way of ordering the life with all the 
precepts and moral standards is based on divine guidance 
through his prophets and the last of such guidance is the 
Quran and the last messenger is Mohammad S.A.W. whose 
conduct and utterances are revered. (See S. Abdul 
A’laMaududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 7th Ed., 
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March 1980).  The question here is this: Was this the 
meaning intended by the framers of the Constitution? For 
this purpose, it is necessary to trace the history of Islam in 
this country after the British intervention in the affairs of the 
Malay States at the close of the last century.”  
The Supreme Court added: 
“…it can be seen that during the British colonial period, 
through their system of indirect rule and establishment of 
secular institutions, Islamic law was rendered isolated in a 
narrow confinement of the law of marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance only. (See M.B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South-
east Asia, 1984.)  
In our view, it is in this sense of dichotomy that the framers 
of the Constitution understood the meaning of the word 
‘Islam’ in the context of art 3. If it had been otherwise, there 
would have been another provision in the Constitution which 
would have the effect that any law contrary to the injunction 
of Islam will be void.  Far from making such provision, Article 
162, on the other hand, purposely preserves the continuity of 
secular law prior to the Constitution, unless such law is 
contrary to the latter.” 
Fundamental Liberties 
[30] Next I want to turn to say something about human rights. The 
Federal Constitution, which provides for specific provisions on 
human rights, is one of the earliest document safeguarding and 
protecting human rights of the people.  Part II of the Constitution 
guarantees all those rights and freedom that are inherent in every 
human being.  Consisting of articles 5-13, it is the Malaysian bill of 
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rights, which is referred to as fundamental liberties. These are, 
among others, the right to life and personal liberty; equality before 
the law; freedom of speech and expression; the right to assemble 
peaceably and the right to form associations; freedom of religion; 
rights of property and to be compensated on expropriation. But at 
the same time, the Constitution also recognizes the federal 
legislature’s power to legislate restrictions to these fundamental 
liberties.  
[31] The parallel legal system and human rights challenges have 
resulted in a complicated overlapping web of jurisdictions. May I 
illustrate this by reference to Berjaya Books Sdn Bhd & Ors v 
Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2014] 1 MLJ 
138. There, the first applicant owned the Borders Bookstore 
(Borders). The second applicant, a non-Muslim, was its general 
manager and the third applicant, a Muslim, was a store manager at 
a branch of Borders, which was raided by religious enforcement 
officers. Several copies of books were seized. The officers 
questioned both the Muslim and non-Muslim staff and ordered 
some of them to attend at first respondent's office for further 
questioning and to provide written statements. At the time of the 
raid and seizure, the Home Ministry had not banned the 
publications. The third applicant was prosecuted in the sharia court 
under the relevant sharia criminal offence for selling publications 
deemed contrary to sharia law. In their judicial review application, 
the applicants sought to quash the various decisions made and 
actions taken by the religious authority.  
[32] In allowing the application, the High Court held it had 
jurisdiction to hear the application, which involved the interpretation 
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of laws concerning fundamental liberties as enshrined in the 
Federal Constitution. The prosecution of the third applicant in the 
sharia court infringed article 7 of the Federal Constitution as she 
was being punished for an act, which was not punishable by law at 
the time it was allegedly committed. 
[33] In affirming the decision of the High Court, the Court of Appeal 
held that the High Court exercising its supervisory civil jurisdiction is 
at liberty to interpret laws on fundamental liberties and to adjudicate 
on unconstitutional conduct by public authorities; the civil court has 
the jurisdiction and power to judicially review the improper institution 
of criminal proceedings when the impugned conduct is in fact not 
criminal in nature.  It is the duty of the court to ‘uphold, protect and 
to ensure that justice is administered in a regular and effective 
manner according to law’.  On 25.8.2015, the Federal Court 
dismissed the religious authority application to appeal against the 
decision of the Court of Appeal.  In the context of the civil and 
sharia dichotomy, such a clear pronouncement by the Court of 
Appeal underlined the duty and powers of the civil courts in 
protecting the fundamental liberties of the citizens. 
[34] I now turn to a very important case, which had resonated at 
home and internationally.  I have mentioned it earlier in my opening. 
The case concerns the right of a catholic publication to use the word 
“Allah” as the word for the Christian God in its Malay language 
version, with the opposite side asserting that the word “Allah” is 
exclusive to Islam. It is the landmark constitutional law case of 
Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Menteri 
Dalam Negeri & Ors [2014] 4 MLJ 765. In that case, the 
Archbishop was granted a publication permit by the Federal Minister 
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of Home Affairs to publish the ‘Herald’, the Catholic Weekly, subject 
to the condition he was prohibited from using the word “Allah” in the 
publication, which was circulated online. The applicant applied for 
judicial review in the High Court to quash the decision of the 
Minister, questioning whether the decision was reasonable, 
constitutional and accordance with the law. In opposing the judicial 
review application, the Minister had also taken into consideration 
various state enactments, which seeks to control and restrict the 
propagation of non-Islamic religious doctrines and belief amongst 
Muslims. The Minister declared that he had imposed such a ban in 
the interests of security. These provisions provide for an offence 
relating to the use of certain words and expressions, which includes 
the word “Allah”. 
 
[35] The High Court upheld the challenge. The High Court granted 
an order of certiorari to quash the Minister’s decision, and granted 
declarations to the effect that the Archbishop constitutional right to 
use the word “Allah” in the Herald.  What was essentially a matter of 
security turned into a constitutional issue of freedom of religion.  
The Court of Appeal set this decision aside when it upheld the right 
of the state legislature to enact laws, to ensure the protection and 
sanctity of Islam. The decision of the Court of Appeal meant that the 
Catholic Church was effectively prohibited from producing 
publications for circulation online with words “Allah” as the word for 
the Christian God in its Malay language version. The Federal Court 
rejected leave to appeal as the case was on an issue of judicial 
review of administrative action rather on the issue of freedom of 
religion. The Court held that the central issue was whether the 
Minister was acting within the powers under the legislation and the 
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concern as always in judicial review cases, not with the merits of the 
decision but with the manner in which the decision was made. 
 
[36] These cases show the fundamental challenge that affects all 
Malaysian is how to reconcile a liberal democratic constitution that 
protects all citizens and people within Malaysia and yet grants 
recognition to the status of Islam.22 
 
Multi-legislature Conflicts 
[37] I should now move on to another aspect of the subject. I 
mentioned at the outset that the Constitution demarcates the extent 
of the legislative powers of the federal and state governments. Let 
me turn to this again and explain in a little more detail about what I 
shall call multi-legislature conflicts that has a profound impact on 
the protection of fundamental liberties. The federal parliament may 
make laws only on federal subjects and a state legislature only on 
state subjects. If there is any inconsistency between federal law and 
state law, federal law prevails.  
[38] This may appear at first sight to be a straightforward 
distribution of powers. However, a little careful observation reveals 
that the situation is in fact more complicated than this. In particular, 
the state legislature may make laws, among others, on creation and 
punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam 
against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters 
included in the federal list. The law governing the Islamic faith is 
enacted pursuant to this provision of the Federal Constitution, which 
regulates day-to-day practices of Malaysian Muslims; such as 
conversion and apostasy, false doctrine, propagation of religious 
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doctrine, sanctity of the religion of Islam and its institution, offences 
relating to decency and others miscellaneous offences. 
[39] There is no definition of the word ‘precepts’ in the Federal 
Constitution.   What offences and punishment that can be enacted 
by the state legislatures was duly considered by Federal Court in 
Sulaiman Takrib v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu; Kerajaan 
Malaysia (intervener) & Other cases [2009] 2 CLJ 54. In that 
case, the court was asked to consider the issue of whether the non-
compliance of a fatwa (religious edicts) issued by the religious 
authority is an offence against the precepts of Islam. The Federal 
Court in addressing the issue held that the term ‘the precepts of 
Islam’ is very wide covering the three main domains i.e. creed or 
belief (aqidah), law (sharia) and ethics or morality (akhlak) and 
included the teachings in the Qur'an and Sunnah.  It was also held 
that it would not be correct to conclude that only the five pillars of 
Islam form the precepts of Islam.  
[40] In Fathul Bari bin Mat Jahya & Anor v Majlis Agama Islam 
Negeri Sembilan & Ors [2012] 4 MLJ 281, the first petitioner was 
arrested by the religious enforcement officers for conducting a 
religious talk without a tauliah, an offence under the state sharia 
enactment and he was accordingly charged for the said offence at 
the sharia court.  The petitioners filed a petition in the Federal Court 
contending that the sharia offence is invalid on the ground the 
sharia offence is not against precepts of that religion. The Federal 
Court dismissed the petition. Arifin Zakaria CJ in delivering 
judgment of the court held that the state legislative had acted within 
its legislative power; the purpose of that provision was clear, that is, 
to protect the integrity of the aqidah (belief), sharia (law) and akhlak 
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(morality) which constituted the precepts of Islam; the requirement 
of tauliah was necessary to ensure only a person qualified to teach 
the religion was allowed to do so. It was held that the term ‘precepts 
of Islam’ must be accorded a wide and liberal meaning. 
[41] Therefore under the Malaysian federal system, sharia criminal 
law has been placed under state jurisdiction by which all the states 
are given a degree of independent and autonomy although a federal 
law limits punishment by sharia courts.  It is to be noted that under 
Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 [Act 355], the sharia 
court could only impose a maximum RM5,000 fine, six strokes of 
whipping and three years of jail for committing sharia offences. The 
Federal Constitution guarantees the states with legislative powers 
over offences and punishments against the precepts of Islam. The 
case of Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 
1 M.L.J. 119, affirmed the exclusive right of the State to enact 
sharia-based criminal law. There, the plaintiffs were charged with 
doing an act likely to prejudice unity amongst Muslims; they acted 
as unauthorized mosque officials at Friday prayers. The charge 
against them were framed under section 298A of the Penal Code, 
which was enacted by the Federal legislature, an offence of doing 
an act on the ground of religion which was likely to cause disunity or 
prejudice harmony between people professing the same or different 
religion. The Supreme Court by a majority held that section 298A 
was ultra vires Article 74 of the Federal Constitution because in pith 
and substance it dealt directly with religion and not public order, a 
state mater, which was outside the power of parliament to legislate.  
[42] In recent years, criminalization of conduct on the basis of 
religion has given rise to much debate and at times tensed 
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emotions in a largely secular environment.  The question is much 
deeper and more complex one than meets the eye. Opinions are 
deeply divided on this issue and are signs of things to come.  Some 
would argue that Islamic law should not be used to regulate private 
lives of Muslims in areas like praying, drinking, dressing and 
reading.23 It is argued that the Constitution never meant to confer 
powers to the States to make all sins in Islam criminal offences.  
According to these views, faith does not need a regulatory authority.  
[43] But there are others who offer an alternative view. They would 
point out that in Islam, the central view is that the state has a clear-
cut duty to foster morality and to promote all that is right and forbid 
all that is wrong and the criterion is objective, impersonal and 
external. 24 According to this view, states enactments contain 
provisions restricting and/or limiting any acts and conducts of any 
individual Muslim professing the religion of Islam which is contrary 
to the precept and injunction of Islam, based on the Quran and 
Sunnah, being the main sources of the Islamic principles. The 
proponents of this view would argue that the Islamic philosophy of 
sharia law is that an act may be criminalized if it has negative 
implication on the public or the religion and the victimless argument 
is not acceptable because the public is the true victim of such 
crimes as the act affects others in a society. 
[44] The rising challenge in court in recent times has raised major 
constitutional issues concerning the power and role of the civil 
courts in safeguarding fundamental liberties. Questions have now 
been raised whether state legislatures can enact laws to deprive 
Malaysian Muslims of fundamental liberties embodied in the 
Constitution; or whether sharia criminal laws must be consistent 
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with the clauses that guarantees the fundamental liberties of all 
Malaysians, irrespective of their faiths.  
[45] It was against the backdrop of this uncharted water, these 
issues were put before the court.  In early 2014, a challenge was 
mounted to question the constitutionality of a sharia enactment that 
criminalized cross-dressing. In State Government of Negeri 
Sembilan & Ors v Muhammad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors 
[2015] 6 AMR 248, the appellants are Muslim men.  Medically they 
are not normal males; they have a medical condition called ‘Gender 
Identity Disorder’ (GID), where the desire to dress as a female and 
be recognized as a female is in keeping with the said medical 
condition. Cross-dressing is intrinsic to their nature. In 1992, the 
state legislature enacted a law that provides any male person who, 
in any public place wears a woman’s attire or poses, as a woman 
shall be guilty of an offence. Pursuant to this provision, the 
transgender women have been prosecuted in the sharia court for 
cross-dressing.  
[46] They then applied for a judicial review in the High Court for a 
declaration that the impugned provision violated their fundamental 
rights. The application was dismissed in the High Court. They 
appealed to the Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal ruled in their 
favor. The Court of Appeal struck down the impugned provision as 
unconstitutional and void, noting that it contravened their personal 
liberty, freedom of movement and freedom of expression.  The court 
held that the law in question was discriminatory as it failed to 
recognize transgender women diagnosed with GID.  However, on 
8.10.2015, the Federal Court had reversed and set aside the 
decision of the Court of Appeal on the sole ground that the legal 
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challenge against the impugned provision was void from the very 
beginning it was filed. The Federal Court has reiterated the 
important point that constitutional challenge of this nature should 
have been filed straight to the Federal Court.  Hence, the conflict in 
this contentious issue remains.  
[47] My next example is a case that challenged the 
constitutionality of a sharia enactment that criminalized the selling of 
books deemed unislamic. In ZI Publications Sdn Bhd & Anor v. 
Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor 
(Intervener) [2015] 8 CLJ 621, the first petitioner published a 
Malay translation of a book written by a Canadian author. The 
religious enforcement officers raided the first petitioner’s office and 
confiscated copies of the book on the basis that they were contrary 
to the state sharia law.  The second petitioner was charged before 
the sharia court with offences for his involvement in the publication 
of the book under the impugned provision. The petitioners then filed 
a petition in the Federal Court seeking for a declaration that the 
impugned provision is invalid on the ground that it restricts freedom 
of expression enshrined in the Constitution, a matter upon which 
only the federal parliament has the power to legislate. 
[48] On 28.9.2015, the Federal Court held that it was within the 
power of the state legislature to legislate the impugned provision 
because it was an offence against the precept of Islam. Applying 
the principle of harmonious interpretation, it was held that that no 
one provision of the Constitution can be considered in isolation and 
that the impugned provision must be considered with all the other 
provisions bearing upon that particular subject.  
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[49] The Federal Court declared in no uncertain term that Muslims 
in Malaysia were not only subjected to the general laws enacted by 
parliament but also to state laws of religious nature enacted by the 
state legislature. This is a truly landmark decision; it signifies that 
fundamental liberties for Malaysian Muslims are not simply to be 
judged in accordance with the entrenched clauses but must also be 
considered from the Islamic perspective as a consequence of the 
constitutional provisions enacted exclusively for the Muslims.   
Freedom to Live Under Sharia Law 
[50] As we have seen, the parallel legal system essentially means 
Muslims have the right to be governed by sharia law as allowed 
under the Federal Constitution. It is the legitimate expectation of 
Muslims to be governed by their own laws.25 The right to practice 
Islamic law for Muslims is a contentious issue in Malaysia and at 
times is a source of so much anxiety. It was said that the disputes 
are rooted in the tension created by the marginalization of Islamic 
law and administration in the Federal Constitution as state matters 
with very limited jurisdiction which goes against the wishes of 
Muslims, who constitutes the majority in Malaysia, to live under 
sharia law.26  According to these views, the Muslims in Malaysia 
have been deprived of the right to follow and practice their religion 
and their laws and all they are asking is that they be given the right 
to profess and practice their religion and their way of life.27 It was 
said that just as the Muslims would like the non-Muslims to be free 
to follow their own religions and customary laws, so too the Muslims 
would like to have the freedom to follow their religion and law. It was 
observed that the recent trend towards Islamization in Malaysia is 
only an attempt to store to the Muslims the right to profess and 
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practice their religion, from which they have for long been 
deprived.28 
 
[51] It was against this background and in such an atmosphere 
that in March 2015, the Kelantan State Legislative Assembly 
passed amendments to the Syariah Criminal Code (II) Enactment 
1993 (Amendment 2015) to pave the way for the state to implement 
the sharia law which now has, among others, provisions, such as 
death penalty by stoning for adultery with married partners, 
whipping of between 40 and 80 lashes for consumption of alcohol, 
and amputation of limbs for theft.  To this end, the state government 
is planning to table a private member’s bill to amend the Syariah 
Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965.  As noted earlier, under the 
legislation, the sharia court could only impose a maximum RM5,000 
fine, six strokes of whipping and three years of jail for committing 
sharia offences. The private bill seeks to widen the scope of 
punishments meted out by the sharia court in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the Islamic penal law or hudud in the state of 
Kelantan.  In the meanwhile four litigants filed an action in the High 
Court seeking a declaration that the private’s bill in the Federal 
Legislature is against the Federal Constitution.  At the same time a 
petition was filed by three individuals pursuant to art 4(4) of the 
Federal Constitution for a declaration that Amendment 2015 is null 
and void as being contrary to the Federal Constitution. Opinions 
have been given that Amendment 2015 is null and void because it 
is unconstitutional as it creates hudud offences, including offences, 
which are under the federal jurisdiction, besides legislating on other 
federal criminal law offences. Views have also been advanced that 
for offences which are within the jurisdiction of the State, it is also 
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null and void because it conflicts with federal law, that is, the 
Syari’ah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965.29 
 
Jurisdictional Conflicts Between The Civil and Sharia Courts 
[52] The next topic to which I turn is jurisdictional conflicts between 
the civil and sharia courts that I have already made passing 
reference.  Although the administration of justice by the sharia court 
is confined to personal law for Muslims and certain offences against 
the precepts of Islam, which constitute a small proportion of the 
entire legal system, nevertheless they raise issues which concerns 
public interest and on fundamental liberties that affect not only the 
Muslims but the non-Muslims as well.  
 
[53] In recent years, difficult issues have arisen which sparked 
jurisdictional conflicts between the sharia court and the civil court. 
Many issues are involved in this thorny state of affairs. In such 
cases, the jurisdictional demarcation between civil and sharia courts 
becomes blurring. There have been a number of instances, where 
the same subject matter was brought before both the sharia and 
civil courts, resulting in increased costs, conflicting interpretation 
and painful uncertainty.  
[54] Difficult questions arise when there is a change of personal 
status, in cases of conversion into Islam or conversion out of Islam.  
In a multi-religious society as in Malaysia, conversion from one 
religion to another is not a new occurrence. The issues involved are 
multifaceted: whether a deceased died a Muslim and application by 
Muslim to leave Islam.  The issue of conversion involving a Muslim 
and non-Muslim always involves the jurisdictional conflict between 
the sharia courts and the civil courts. When a dispute arises over 
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the person’s faith or more specifically whether a person has 
become a Muslim convert, often questions are raised on whether 
the sharia courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear it.  As Islamic 
matters belong to the state jurisdictions, Muslims who intend to 
leave the Islamic faith are subject to provisions in relation to 
apostasy that are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sharia 
courts, which human rights advocates argue violate the liberty 
clause of the Federal Constitution.  A number of Muslims look to the 
civil courts to uphold their right to religious freedom.  When a 
dispute arises over the person’s faith or more specifically whether a 
Muslim has left Islam, often questions are raised on which courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear it. The case of Lina Joy v Majlis 
Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 119 upheld the 
proposition that only sharia court can decide if a person is 
apostasied from Islam even though the Constitution guarantees for 
all citizens freedom of choice of religion.  It was held that the issue 
of an act of conversion out of Islam must be subject to the relevant 
sharia law to be determined by the sharia courts. 
[55] My next example on jurisdictional conflicts concerned the 
issue of a child’s religious rights and the subsequent bitter tussle 
over the custody of the child that of late ignited controversy. The 
case of Shamala a/p Sathiyaseelan v Dr Jeyaganesh a/l C 
Mogarajah (also known as Muhammad Ridzwan bin Mogarajah) 
& Anor [2011] 2 MLJ 281, is one of the most high profile and long 
drawn-out child custody case.  It involved an ethnic couple that was 
married in a Hindu ceremony.  The couple separated and the father 
converted to Islam. Then he secretly converted his two children to 
Islam, without the mother’s consent and obtained custody through 
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the sharia court. The father then filed for child custody and obtained 
custody through the sharia court. The Hindu mother was also 
granted guardianship, but through the civil courts. This is a recurring 
family disputes although it is well settled law that civil courts 
continue to have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of divorce as well 
as custody of the children nothwithstanding the coversion of one of 
the party to a non-Muslim marriage to the religion of Islam (see 
Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangatoray [2008] 
2 MLJ 147 and Tan Sung Mooi v Too Miew Kin [1994] 3 MLJ 
117). 
[56] Those cases highlight a growing practical problem with 
Malaysia’s dual parallel legal system and those caught in between. 
Sharia law on offences against the precepts of Islam as well as 
personal matters like marriage and custody rights binds Muslims, 
while members of other faiths follow civil law. Some would argue 
that cases of this nature show that non-Muslims may be obliquely 
subjected to sharia court. 
Britain, A Multi-religious Society 
[57] I now turn to the position in Britain.  Contemporary Britain is a 
pluralistic and multi-faith society than ever before in its history. 
According to the 2001 census, the population of Britain was 
estimated to be 57 million people, the majority of whom identified 
itself as Christian, with the remainder being Muslim (2.8%), Hindu 
(1.0), Sikh (0.6%), Jewish (0.5%), Buddhist (0.3%) and others. The 
fact that the population is increasingly religiously diverse is 
described by Munby LJ in Singh v Entry Clearance Officer New 
Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075 in the following words: 
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“There have been enormous changes in the social and 
religious life of our country. The fact is that we live in a 
secular and pluralistic society. But we also live in a multi-
cultural community of many faiths. One of the paradoxes of 
our lives is that we live in a society which is at one and the 
same time becoming both increasingly secular but also 
increasingly diverse religious affiliation. Our society includes 
men and women from every corner of the globe and of every 
creed and color under the sun.” 
[58] There is a strong association at the state level between 
national identity and the Church of England. The head of state, Her 
Majesty the Queens is the head of the Church and 26 of its bishops 
have seats in the House of Lords. No representatives from other 
religious organizations have a right to membership of the House of 
Lords. The Queen’s coronation oath, in which she promised to 
maintain in the country the Protestant religion, mirrors the unique 
constitutional position of Christianity in Britain.  Anglican prayers are 
said at the start of each day in both the House of Lords and the 
House of Commons. The judiciary of England and Wales begin 
each legal year with a spectacular service in Westminster Abbey.  
In 2004, the Prime Minister stated that ‘we are a Christian 
country’.30 Blasphemy, later narrowed to scurrilous vilification is an 
offence restricted to attacks on Christian religion. In R v Chief 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Choudhury 
[1991] 1 QB, 429, the court rejected the right of a person to bring 
criminal action against the author and publisher of “The Satanic 
Verses” for “a blasphemous libel concerning Allah, the common 
deity to all religions of the world”.  Historically, the significance 
relationship between Christianity and the application of law can be 
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seen in Taylor’s case [1675] 1 Vent 293, 86 ER 189 where Hale 
CJ in convicting the accused of blasphemy said: 
“to say religion is a cheat is to dissolve all those obligations 
whereby the civil societies are preserved, and that 
Christianity is parcel of the laws of England: and therefore to 
reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of 
the law.” 
[59] English law is treated as a legal system that applies to 
everybody equally irrespective off his or her faith or religion. Those 
who come to this country must take its law as they find them.31 So 
far as the law is concerned, those who live in this country are 
governed by English law and subject to the jurisdiction of the 
English courts.  According to this notion of ‘legal centralism’, law is 
and should be the law of the state, uniform for all purposes, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state 
institutions. 32 While the predominant view is that different legal 
systems cannot exist within the one-nation-state structure, common 
values of tolerance of religious differences and diversity is a 
characteristic that is frequently cited as British values; other faiths 
are allowed to co-exist alongside the Church of England. Indeed 
tolerance is the most important aspiration of pluralism; it accepts 
genuine difference, including deep moral and faith disagreement. 
People are free to practice their religion and differing religious laws 
and practices are free to operate unless restrained by the law.33 The 
lack of formal prohibitions and disabilities now means that people 
are in general free to worship in churches, synagogues, mosques 
and temples when, where and how they please.34 
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[60] There is nothing in the English law that prevents people 
abiding by the sharia law if they wish to, provide it does not conflict 
with English law. The court here generally recognizes that in a 
tolerant society of contemporary times there is need to guard 
against the tyranny, which the majority opinion may impose on the 
minority.35 Concerning the role of the judiciary in a pluralistic society, 
Munby LJ in Sulaiman v Juffali [2002] 1 FLR 479, said: 
“Although historically this country is part of the Christian west, 
and although it has an established church which is Christian, 
I sit as a secular judge serving a multi-cultural community of 
many faiths in which all of us can now take pride, sworn to 
do justice ‘to all manner of people’. Religion—whatever the 
particular believer’s faith—is no doubt something to be 
encouraged but it is not the business of government or of the 
secular courts. So the starting point of the law is an 
essentially agnostic view of religious beliefs and a tolerant 
indulgence to religious and cultural diversity. A secular judge 
must be wary of straying across the well-recognized divide 
between church and state. It is not for a judge to weigh one 
religion against another. All are entitled to equal respect, 
whether in times of peace or, as at present, amidst the clash 
of arms.” 
[61] In 2004, the Home Office stated that ‘integration’ is not about 
assimilation into a single homogenous culture and there is space 
within the concept of “British” for people to express their religious 
and cultural beliefs. 36  In its ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’ 
released in October 2015, the British Government noted: 
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“1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that 
have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and 
shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and 
are underpinned by our most important local and national 
institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, 
individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and 
understanding of different faiths and beliefs.  
2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to 
decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our 
own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to 
worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools 
and give our children – boys and girls alike – the best 
education possible.” 
[62] In 2013, the Woolf Institute (an academic institute in 
Cambridge that specializes in interfaith relations) convened an 
independent commission, namely Commission on Religion and 
Belief in British Public Life to undertake the first systematic review 
of the role of religion and belief in Britain today. The objectives of 
the commission are to: 
(a) Consider the place and role of religion and belief in 
contemporary Britain, and the significance of emerging 
trends and identities; 
 
(b) Examine how ideas of Britishness and national identity 
may be inclusive of a range of religions and beliefs, and 
may in turn influence people’s self-understanding; 
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(c) Explore how shared understandings of the common 
good may contribute to greater levels of mutual trust and 
collective action, and to a more harmonious society; and 
 
(d) Make recommendations for public life and policy. 
[63] The Commission was chaired by the Rt. Hon. Baroness 
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss of Marsh Green GBE (the first female Lord 
Justice of the Court of Appeal) and has taken two years to prepare 
its 104 - page report entitled “Living with Difference” which has been 
released on 7 December 2015.  The Commission included Christian, 
Muslim, Sikh and Hindu representatives as theological experts.  The 
report called for a change to public policy on religion and belief to 
take account of the increasing impact of religion around the world 
and the more diverse nature of society in Britain. Its aim was to 
suggest practical ways for government and people to respond to 
social change to ensure a shared understanding of the fundamental 
values underlying public life that guarantee religious freedom while 
protecting the liberties and values of non-believers. 
[64] According to the report, Britain has seen a general decline in 
its Christian affiliation.  Only two in five British people now identify 
as Christian. The report noted that Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism 
have overtaken Judaism as the largest non-Christians faiths in 
Britain. The proportion of people who do not follow a religion has 
risen from just under a third in 1983 to almost half in 2014. The 
report recommended that the time has come for public life to take 
on more ‘pluralist character’.  It said that the pluralist character of 
modern society should be reflected in national forums such as the 
House of Lords, so that they include a wider range of worldviews 
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and religious traditions, and of Christian denominations other than 
the Church of England. The report noted that major state occasions 
such as coronation should be changed to be more inclusive, while 
the number of bishops in the House of Lords should be reduced to 
make way for leaders of other religions. The report recommended 
scrapping the law requiring schools to hold acts of collective 
worship and reducing the number of children given places at 
schools based on religion.  It recommended for new protections for 
women in sharia courts and other religious tribunals including a call 
for the government to consider requiring couples who have a non-
legally binding religious marriage also to have a civil registration. 
The Recognition of Religious Law 
[65] As a matter of general rule, the courts are by and large 
reluctant to become involved in judging internal disputes within 
religious group regarding religious law.37 Lord Hope in the Supreme 
Court in R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS 
and the Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS and others; R (on the 
application of E) v Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions 
Appeal Panel of JFS and others (United Synagogue 
intervening) [2009] UKSC 15 said, ‘ it has long been understood 
that it is not the business of the courts to intervene in matters of 
religion’ but he emphasized that this important exception, ‘It is just 
as well understood, however, that the divide is crossed when the 
parties to the dispute have deliberately left the sphere of matters 
spiritual over which the religious body has exclusive jurisdiction and 
engaged in matters that are regulated by the civil courts.  This was 
underlined by the Court of Appeal decision in C and another v City 
of Westminster Social and Community Services Department 
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and another [2008] EWCA Civ 198 concerning a purported 
marriage by telephone link between England and Bangladesh and a 
lack of mental capacity of one party. The Court of Appeal held that 
while this was a valid marriage under Islamic law and Bangladeshi 
law it was not valid under English law: the circumstances made the 
marriage sufficiently offensive to the conscience of the English court 
that it should refuse to recognize it.  
The Impact of Human Rights Act 1998 
[66] Britain does not have a written constitution protecting 
fundamental rights. There is no constitutional clause guaranteeing 
religious freedom. In 1998 the Human Rights Act was passed 
paving the way for the incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), 
everyone in Britain has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. The HRA 1998 created a new legal regime and 
represents a significant change in the legal system.  It undoubtedly 
has an important impact on the fundamental rights of the individual 
because it is the first time that legislation recognized a general 
positive legal right to religious freedom, enforceable in domestic 
courts. This development is of particular interest as European 
jurisprudence as well as national law affects the individual. Article 
9.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is made 
part of the HRA 1998, provides that everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
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Freedom of thought is absolute and unqualified: anyone can believe 
what he or she like.  
[67] But article 9.2 provides that the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or beliefs can be subject to limitations, though only to those 
which are “prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”.  Article 14 of the European Convention also provides that 
the enjoyment of the rights protected by the Convention, such as 
the right to liberty or the right to freedom of expression, must be 
secured without unjustified discrimination on a wide variety of 
grounds, including religion or belief.  In Kokkinakis v Greece (App 
no 14307/88) [1993] ECHR 14307/88, the European Court of 
Human Rights said: 
‘As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic 
society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its 
religious dimension, one of the most vital elements, that go 
to make up the identity of believers and their conception of 
life, but it is also a precious asset to atheists, agnostics, 
skeptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over 
the centuries, depends on it.’ 
[68] On the right to freedom of religion, the Research Division of 
the European Court of Human Rights in its updated document on 31 
October 2013 entitled ‘Overview of the court’s case-law on 
freedom of religion’ stated: 
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“14. In a democratic society, in which several religions or 
branches of the same religion coexist within one and the 
same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions 
on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the 
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are 
respected. However, in exercising its regulatory power in this 
sphere and in its relations with the various religions, 
denominations and beliefs, the State has a duty to remain 
neutral and impartial. What is at stake here is the 
preservation of pluralism and the proper functioning of 
democracy (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. 
Moldova, no. 45701/99, §§ 115-16, ECHR 2001-XII).  
15. In this sensitive area involving the establishment of 
relations between the religious communities and the State, 
the latter in theory enjoys a wide margin of appreciation 
(Cha’are Shalom VeTsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 
84, ECHR 2000-VII). In order to determine the scope of the 
margin of appreciation the Court must take into account what 
is at stake, namely the need to maintain true religious 
pluralism, which is inherent in the concept of a democratic 
society. Moreover, in exercising its supervision, the Court 
must consider the interference complained of on the basis of 
the file as a whole (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and 
Others, cited above, § 119).” 
[69] In Young, James and Webster (applicants) v. The United 
Kingdom (respondents) [1981] IRLR 408, the European Court of 
Human Rights said: 
“Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are the 
hallmarks of a ‘democratic society’.  Although individual 
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interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a 
group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a 
majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved 
which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and 
avoids any abuse of a dominant position.” 
[70] Domestic case law on freedom of religion is developing as a 
result of the implementation of the HRA 1998. In cases brought 
under Article 9, the court has to consider whether there has been an 
interference with the right to manifest a religion or belief and, if so, 
whether the interference is justified. In Ahmad v. the United 
Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR 126, a teacher felt forced to resign 
because the school refused him permission to leave work 45 
minutes early to attend a mosque during work hours. The European 
Commission on Human Rights found that his Article 9 rights had not 
been interfered with because he had freely entered into his contract. 
Moreover, he had not notified his employer of his religious 
observance needs at the time of his recruitment, or for the following 
six years. The Commission ruled that Mr. Ahmad had been free to 
resign and find employment elsewhere on terms that reflected his 
religious needs. 
[71] A similar approach was adopted in Stedman v. the United 
Kingdom [1997] 23 EHRR CD 168, in which an employer required 
the Christian applicant to work on Sundays sometime after she had 
been in the job.  The Commission dismissed her Article 9 complaint, 
ruling that she ‘was dismissed for failing to agree to work certain 
hours rather than for her religious belief as such and was free to 
resign and did in effect resign from her employment’.  
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[72] As noted by Samantha Knights, Freedom of Religion, 
Minorities, And the Law, the European Court of Human Rights on 
a number of occasions has made reference to the particular need 
protect minorities. In Connors v United Kingdom [2005] 40 EHRR 
9, the court made reference to the vulnerable position of Gypsies as 
a minority which meant that some special consideration should be 
given to their needs and their different lifestyle, both in the relevant 
regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases.  
In Chapman v United Kingdom [2001] 33 EHRR 18, the court 
noted that there was an emerging international consensus 
recognizing the special needs of minorities and an obligation to 
protect their security, identity and lifestyle, although it was not 
persuaded that the consensus was sufficiently concrete for it to 
derive any guidance as to the conduct or standards which 
contracting states considered desirable in any particular situation. 
[73] The domestic courts have tended to follow this approach. For 
example, in Copsey v. W.W.B. Devon Clays Ltd [2005] I CR 1789, 
the Court of Appeal found that the claimant’s rights had not been 
interfered with when his employer changed his working days to 
include Sunday, as he could find another job, which would enable 
him to attend Sunday religious services. Similarly, in R. (S.B.) v. 
Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100, in which 
the House of Lords found that the application of a school’s uniform 
policy did not breach the Article 9 rights of the Muslim claimant, a 
majority of the Court took the view that there was no interference 
with the claimant’s rights. Shabina Begum, a 16-year-old Muslim girl, 
was sent home from her school in Luton, Bedfordshire, for wearing 
a full-length ‘jilbab’ rather than the school uniform which the school 
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had introduced following consultation with local mosques, 
community leaders and parents. Ms. Begum remained out of 
education for two years before she began to attend another school, 
which allowed her to wear the jilbab. A majority of the House of 
Lords found that the school’s uniform policy did not constitute an 
interference with her Article 9 rights. Following the approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the majority stated that a rule 
does not infringe the right of an individual to manifest his or her 
religion ‘merely because the rule does not conform to the religious 
beliefs of that individual. And in particular this is so where the 
individual has a choice whether or not to avail himself or herself of 
the services of that institution’ or ‘other public institutions offering 
similar services, and whose rules do not include the objectionable 
rule in question’. 
Towards A Broader Recognition of Plurality 
[74] In its treatment of ethnic and religious groups, one approach 
employed is the rule and exemption model, which is a form of 
pluralist recognition to reflect the multi-religious realities.  On this 
basis generally applicable laws are passed to accommodate the 
cultural and religious value systems of the minorities. For instance, 
the law has granted exemptions to turbaned Sikhs from wearing 
motorcycle helmets.  Chapter 62 of the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets 
(Religious Exemption) Act 1976 states that s. 32(2A) of the Road 
Traffic Act, 1972 shall not apply to Sikh motorcyclists, provided they 
are wearing turbans while riding motorcycles. This approach is 
reaffirmed by section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988 under 
which Sikhs are now allowed to carry knives and daggers (kirpans) 
in public places for religious purposes. Similarly, the law has 
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granted Jews and Muslims from being subject to rules requiring the 
stunning of animals before slaughter for food in recognizing of their 
religious needs regarding halal and kosher meat. The Slaughter of 
Poultry Act, 1967 and the Slaughterhouses Act, 1974 recognized 
the right of Muslims and Jews to slaughter animals according to 
their religious practices without stunning them first.  
Place of Religion in Public Life in An Increasingly  
Plural Society 
 
[75] Against the background of increasingly plural society of 
modern Britain, in recent years, there has been a revival of interest 
on the place and role of religion. There are ongoing debate in 
Britain related to parallel legal system and legal pluralism and the 
main issue in this debate revolved around the question to what 
extent the personal law of religious minorities might be 
accommodated in the domestic legal system?   
[76] On 7 February 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. 
Rowan Williams, gave a lecture in the Great Hall of the Royal 
Courts of Justice entitled ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: A 
Religious Perspective’ which largely dealt on the relationship 
between religious law and civil law in England and Wales. In that 
lecture, which was to be a reflection to all religious groups, the 
Archbishop sought to bring to a higher level of public debate to the 
question of ‘what it is like to live under more than one (legal) 
jurisdiction’ and how far the civil law of the land should recognize or 
accommodate a legal pluralism based on religious adherence.  
[77] The Archbishop presented his idea that the state should 
consider moving beyond the present legally positivist system, which 
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he characterized as an ‘unqualified secular legal monopoly’ to a 
system in which there would be some form of accommodation of 
religious or cultural norms.  He saw individuals in modern society as 
having multiple and sometimes overlapping allegiances. By this 
accommodation, individuals would be able to choose whether they 
wanted certain limited matters to be dealt with by secular or by 
religious principles. He pointed out that it was possible for 
individuals to conduct their lives in accordance with sharia principles 
without this being in conflict with the rights guaranteed by English 
law. 
[78] The subjects the Archbishop stipulated as possibly able for 
this accommodation were some features of marital law, the 
regulation of financial transactions and authorized structures of 
mediation and conflict resolution. Controversy flared up when the 
Archbishop implied that the British commitments to pluralism might 
necessitate the legal system to recognize certain aspect of Islamic 
law. It was his discussion of Islam that attracted much attention. 
This idea was acknowledged as very controversial.  It triggered a 
storm of protest when he suggested that some accommodation 
between British law and Islam’s sharia was ‘inevitable’, even though 
he did not call for its accommodation as some kind of parallel 
jurisdiction to the civil law. 
[79] This debate was later intensified when Lord Phillips (the then 
Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales) in a lecture entitled 
“Equality before the Law”, delivered at the East London Muslim 
Centre, 3 July 2008 reiterated the English law principle that every 
citizen has a right to do what he likes unless restrained by the 
common law or by statute.  It was this freedom, Lord Phillips stated, 
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that allowed people to exercise their religions freely; and 
concomitantly there could be, and indeed there already is, some 
accommodation for dispute resolution in accordance with religious 
principles based upon the consent of the parties. Based on this he 
added, “There is no reason why principles of Sharia Law, or any 
other religious code should not be the basis for mediation or other 
forms of alternative dispute resolution”, however any sanctions for a 
failure to comply with the agreed terms of the mediation would be 
drawn from English law. He suggested that there should be some 
accommodation made to religious communities within the existing 
legal framework and supported by legislation. Lord Phillips, however, 
did not advocate that the sharia or indeed any other religious 
system of law, should apply in the UK as a separate system of legal 
rules with its own officially sanctioned courts and tribunals.  
Emerging Parallel Legal System 
[80] It is worthy of note that religious courts have already operate 
in this country for over a period of time alongside civil courts in 
England and Wales. There are a number of separate religious 
courts, which have jurisdiction over a variety of matters relating to 
religious law.  In the Church of England a series of ecclesiastical 
courts have jurisdiction over matters dealing with the rights and 
obligations of church members, church doctrine, and ceremony or 
ritual. The ecclesiastical courts are part of the English court 
system.38 
[81] A number of other religious communities also have their own 
network of adjudicating mechanism, which the community may 
choose to call ‘courts’. These are informal religious courts systems 
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or forums for dispute resolution. They do not have the legal status 
of courts. Many, mostly unofficial, sharia courts have emerged and 
currently operating, mainly on a voluntary basis in Muslim 
communities to help deal and resolve family and family disputes 
using Islamic law instead of local or formal court system.39 As far as 
civil law is concerned the council’s decision have little binding power. 
The councils have no official jurisdiction over divorce settlements, 
involving properties, cases involving custody of children, or any 
criminal matters. These informal courts, often based in mosques or 
Muslim schools across the country, deal with marital disputes and 
even child custody as well as financial matters in line with religious 
teaching and applied Islamic principles within the British legal 
system. They offer mediation and reconciliation rather than 
adjudication but the proceedings are conducted like courts with 
religious scholars or legal experts sitting in a manner more akin to 
judges rather than counsellors. The parties abide by the decisions, 
which they accept as obligatory but which are not enforced by the 
civil courts.   
[82] There is a perception that this is a parallel justice system that 
discriminates women. Critics say that the unacceptable and 
arbitrary religious courts are treating large numbers of Muslim 
women as second-class citizens. Its defenders, however, claim 
Muslim women are better off with the sharia courts than with a 
vacuum. 
[83] The religious communities have also made use of private 
arbitration for the resolution of intra-communal family disputes in 
accordance with their understanding of their respective religious 
laws. The UK is broadly accommodating of ADR processes such as 
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conciliation and arbitration, whether of commercial or private 
disputes and allows parties to choose the law that they which to 
apply to their agreements. For example, the activities of London 
Beth Din deals with vast and covers all areas of Jewish law 
encompassing marriage, divorces, conversions, adoption and 
resolving civil disputes.  In Jewish law, civil disputes between 
Jewish parties are required to be adjudicated by a Beth Din 
adopting Jewish law to be applied to the dispute. The London Beth 
Din sits as an arbitral tribunal in respect of civil disputes. The parties 
to any such disputes are required to sign an Arbitration Agreement 
prior to a hearing-taking place. The effect of this is that the award 
given by the Beth Din has the full force of an Arbitration Award and 
may be enforced (with the prior permission of the Beth Din) by the 
civil courts. At a hearing before the Dayanim, the parties do not 
require legal representation though they are allowed to have legal 
or their representation. 
[84] A number of Muslim Arbitration Tribunals, which is a form of 
alternative dispute resolution for the Muslim community have also 
been set up by private individuals to resolve civil and commercial 
disputes as well personal religious law (other than divorce, child 
custody and criminal matters) in accordance with sharia laws. 
These so-called tribunals are not authorized under the Arbitration 
Act 1996 to give legally binding rulings but they may operate under 
the Act which provides that parties are free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest. 
[85] There are no special provisions for the awards of religious 
tribunals in general or for sharia tribunals in particular.  Some of 
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their decisions, such as arbitration award may be enforced through 
the English court system in the same way and subject to the same 
defences and challenges as an ordinary arbitral award.40  In this 
respect, a court has a general duty to consider that an arbitral 
award complies with public policy and is in the public interest. The 
requirements of public policy would mean that the civil court would 
not enforce any arbitral award that failed to comply with the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
[86] It is a point of debate whether these religious courts and 
tribunals create a parallel legal system in UK and operates within 
the framework of UK law.  In June 2011, Cardiff University 
published a report of a research study on ‘Social Cohesion and 
Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts’.  The aim of 
the research was to collect information on the role and practice of 
religious courts in England and Wales in order to contribute to 
debate concerning the extent to which English law should 
accommodate religious legal systems. The report examines the 
existence of religious courts in the UK, with special reference to 
Judaism, Islam and Christianity.  It is an important research, which 
contributed greatly to public debates about the absorption of plural 
approaches into the English legal system.  Some of the findings are 
as follows: 
(i) There is no monolithic community representing the 
entire body within any of the three faiths we studied.  
 
(ii) There is a multiplicity of religious tribunals within the 
different communities in terms of the basis of their 
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authority and adherence by those using these tribunals. 
Different communities within these faiths may have their 
own religious tribunals ruling on matters relevant to their 
adherents.  
 
(iii) There is no hierarchy of tribunals within the Jewish and 
Muslim communities, and no appeal structure. This has 
led to an interesting element of ‘forum shopping’ by 
litigants. The absence of a hierarchy in the Muslim and 
Jewish communities means that litigants can, to some 
extent, choose which tribunal they go to according to the 
way in which (they think) the law will be applied to them 
or by what they perceive will be the extent of recognition 
of the tribunal’s decision across their community.  
 
(iv) A commonality between all the tribunals in relation to 
staffing is the degree to which their operation rests upon 
volunteers and the services of those who usually have 
other professional religious roles within their 
communities. There is clearly a fusion of religious and 
legal roles.  
 
(v) None of the tribunals studied has a legal status in the 
sense of “recognition” by the state. They derive their 
authority from their religious affiliation, not from the state, 
and that authority extends only to those who choose to 
submit to them.  
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(vi) Process and procedure vary as between the three 
tribunals, reflecting the different approach to the role 
that each takes.  
 
(vii) None of the tribunals has any legal status afforded to 
them by the state or the civil law, and their rulings and 
determinations in relation to marital status have no civil 
recognition either. They derive their authority from their 
religious affiliation, not from the state, and that authority 
extends only to those who choose to submit to them.  
 
(viii) All of the institutions studied see their work as a 
religious duty. They regard themselves as providing 
important mechanisms for the organization of 
community affairs and the fulfillment of community need. 
The structural framework, organization, resourcing and 
staffing of each of the tribunals in many ways reflect the 
history, economic resources and social development of 
the communities they serve.  
[87] The research by Cardiff University did not cover how the 
Kurdish community developed and practiced continues alternative 
dispute resolution when they migrate to London. Dr Latif Tas in his 
book ‘Legal Pluralism in Action: Dispute Resolution and the 
Kurdish Community’ investigated the Kurdish diaspora’s system 
method to resolve conflict in London from a legal pluralism point of 
view which he called the Kurdish Peace Committee (KPC) Model, a 
more secular alternative system which was founded in 2001.  
According to Dr Latif, the Kurds have adapted their customary legal 
practices to create unofficial legal courts and other forms of legal 
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hybridization. The research highlighted that the Kurdish Community 
opted to follow their own customary legal practices while at the 
same time adapting to the new conditions rather than just simply 
recognizing the British legal system.  
[88] The Model proved to be a reliable mechanism to resolve inter-
and intra-community disputes among Kurds as well as in disputes 
with other groups such as Turks and Iranians. The services of the 
KPC are not only used by members of the community who cannot 
afford to use state-based legal system or lack of education but also 
by well-educated members of the Kurdish diaspora. It is interesting 
to note that the Kurdish community’s own ways of dealing with 
disputes have been accorded recognition by the authorities. In 
some cases, members of the Police force took part in meetings held 
by the KPC and the Home Office granted some funding to covers its 
expenses. 
[89] In another relevant noteworthy development, the Law Society 
in March 2004, which represents solicitors in England and Wales, 
had written a guide on sharia succession rules that will be used in 
British courts. This guidance detailed how will should be drafted to 
fit Islamic traditions while being valid under British law. The 
President of the Law Society was quoted to have said that the 
“sharia compliant” guidance would promote ‘good practice’ in 
applying Islamic principles in the British legal system. One effect of 
the guide is that children born outside of marriage and adopted 
children could be denied of their share as that are not sharia heirs. 
It has been said that the groundbreaking guideline has made Islam 
to effectively enshrine in the British legal system for the first time. 
To some the guidance represented a major step on the road to a 
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parallel legal system for Britain’s Muslim communities.  The Law 
Society guideline represents the first time that an official legal body 
has recognized the legitimacy of some sharia principles. 
[90] Recently, however, concerns have been raised over the rise 
of religious tribunals and their unfettered and unregulated activities, 
particularly about sharia courts on the allegations that the courts 
discriminate against women and fail to protect them from violent 
husbands. Baroness Cox, a member of the House of Lords has 
been a leading voice over the years speaking out against certain 
aspects of the sharia courts. On 1 June 2015, she introduced her 
Private Members’ Arbitration and Mediation Services Equality Bill 
into the House of Lords for the fifth consecutive year, which is 
intended to tackle religiously, sanctioned gender discrimination in 
arbitration proceedings and informal mediations.  Among others, the 
Bill sought to state expressly that any criminal or family matter 
cannot be the subject of arbitration proceedings.  The Bill, according 
to Baroness Cox, seeks to address the unacceptable position of a 
parallel quasi-legal system, which threatens the fundamental 
principle of democracy:  one law for all. 
[91] At present the debate gained momentum when the British 
Government released its ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’ on 19 
October 2015, which sets out strategy to defeat extremism in all its 
forms across the country. The government has ordered an 
independent inquiry into sharia councils amid concerns that they 
operate a parallel system of justice that discriminates against 
women.  The Strategy said, “Sharia is being misused and applied in 
a way which is incompatible with the law”.  It went on to state: 
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“Alternative systems of law 
17. Many people in this country of different faiths follow 
religious codes and practices, and benefit from the guidance 
they offer. Religious communities also operate arbitration 
councils and boards to resolve disputes. The overriding 
principle is that these rules, practices and bodies must 
operate within the rule of law in the UK. However, there is 
evidence some Sharia councils may not follow this principle 
and that Sharia is being misused and applied in a way, 
which is incompatible with the law.  
18. There are reports of men and women being charged 
different fees for using the same service, and women facing 
lengthier processes for divorce than men. Most concerning 
of all, women are unaware of their legal rights to leave 
violent husbands and are being pressurized to attend 
reconciliation sessions with their husbands despite legal 
injunctions in place to protect them from violence. There is 
only one rule of law in our country, which provides rights and 
security for every citizen. We will never countenance 
allowing an alternative, informal system of law, informed by 
religious principles, to operate in competition with it.” 
The strategy added: 
“48. In some cases there is evidence of a problem, but we 
have an inadequate understanding of all the issues involved. 
As set out in paragraph 17, one example of this involves the 
application of Sharia law. We will therefore commission an 
independent review to understand the extent to which Sharia 
is being misused or applied in a way, which is incompatible 
with the law. This is expected to provide an initial report to 
the Home Secretary in 2016.”  
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Concluding Comments 
[92] This paper has attempted to show that it is the dichotomy 
between the private and public aspect of the religious freedom, 
which has always give rise to practical and legal complications. 
While the freedom privately to hold particular religious views is 
unlikely to give rise to practical difficulties, it is the position of 
religion in the public sphere and the extent of the right to express 
and manifest religious views that always create considerable 
challenges for any contemporary multi-religious societies.41 It is this 
dichotomy between the private and public aspects of religion that is 
likely to give rise to legal difficulties. 
[93] In Britain, the individual freedom to privately hold and profess 
particular religious views is not likely to give rise to legal problems. 
There is a concern, however, that a parallel legal system, which 
applies religious law and traditions in the public sphere, would lead 
to serious undermining of national cohesion. Parallel laws, which 
result in different law for different group, are thought to foster the 
growth of separate societies within society. It demonstrates an on-
going tension between the appearance of tolerance and the 
maintenance of values deemed to be British.42 
[94] There is particularly an overall disquiet surrounding the 
application of sharia law, as it is perceived not to be substantially 
comparable and equal to the applicable rule of the common law, 
especially in the light of the majority judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and 
others v Turkey (App nos 41340/98, 41442/98, 41343/98 and 
41344/98) [2003] ECHR 41340/98 where it was held that “it is 
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difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights 
while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia which 
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to 
its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status 
of women and the way it intervene spheres of private and public life 
in accordance with religious precepts”. It is perceived that certain 
aspects of the implementation of sharia law would violate gender 
equality within the family. The sharia law and the English law often 
differ irreconcilably in substantive law, procedural law, concept of 
justice, and worldviews. 
[95] The presence of different interpretations of sharia principles 
and prevalence of divergent religious beliefs and practices among 
Muslims further exacerbates the problem of family law pluralism 
within the Muslim community because it reinforces the gap between 
the norms of an objective legal system (whether or not nominally 
Islamic) and the subjective norms of individual Muslims.43 
[96] However, there is no evidence to suggest that Muslims in 
Britain are asking for a wholesale introduction of the application of 
sharia law. The work of the sharia councils suggest that are asking 
for a formal recognition of aspects of sharia relating to Islamic 
personal law in aspects of marital law.  A formal recognition of such 
institutions would facilitate their regulation, which would ensure, 
among other things, the adoption and maintenance of good 
practices and alternative access to justice for many Muslim women 
in the UK who might prefer an Islamic settlement of their disputes to 
litigation in the civil courts.44 
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[97] The rise and increasing importance of religious courts, 
alongside English law, represents an effectively emerging legal 
system within the British’s minority’s communities running in parallel 
or interlocked with British justice system. The minorities have a 
keen interest in preserving and structure their family life within their 
own family law regime. To have to forgo a traditional or religious 
practice may be portrayed as tantamount to the surrender of cultural 
identity and ultimately to the denial of a human right.45 Although 
they are unregulated and unauthorized with little accountability, 
these courts have been touted as the minorities right to religious 
freedom and to be governed by their own religious beliefs and 
practices that would reflect the changing religious composition of 
the British population today.  
[98] The limitations of these religious courts are due to their private 
nature operating outside of public view and meaningful independent 
oversight.  Their rulings have ignited an apprehension for duality of 
law, which arises from concern that their decisions might be 
inconsistent with English law and family law practice.46 
[99] There remains a great deal of uncertainty about what degree 
of accommodation the law of the land can and should give to 
minority communities with their own strongly entrenched legal and 
moral codes.47 The debates continue to what extent a more pluralist 
legal system can be accommodated in which people can choose 
which law they wish to comply with, religious or English one. 
[100]  In Malaysia, the position and application of Islam in the public 
sphere is embedded in the Federal Constitution.  As decided by the 
Federal Court in the case of ZI Publications Sdn Bhd (supra), 
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Muslims in Malaysia are not only subjected to the general laws 
enacted by parliament but also to state laws of religious nature 
enacted by the state legislature.  As far as the Malaysian Muslims 
are concerned the private realm of faith is being regulated by sharia 
criminal legislations. However, there is no uniformity as these 
enactments are passed by the respective state legislatures. 
[101]  The legal demarcation of jurisdiction between the sharia 
courts and civil courts has seen an interaction between sharia and 
civil law and in the process firmly establish what we see today a 
parallel system of justice. It is within this dual system people of 
various races and religion live side by side in harmony.  But as the 
country continues to modernize and democratize and in a more 
secular environment, the limitations and practical difficulties of the 
dual system have at times arisen. 
[102]  The judicial decisions highlighted in this paper have 
recognized that the sharia courts have jurisdiction in matters 
relating to Islam but the decisions have also revealed inadequacies 
and shortcomings not only in the state enactments but also federal 
law.  At times the issue of jurisdiction of the sharia courts involves 
jurisdictional conflict between the sharia courts and the civil courts. 
This is especially true on the difficult and challenging issue of 
conversion into Islam or conversion out of Islam. This issue can be 
sensitive and controversial as the disputes involve one’s faith, 
status, family and parties of different faiths. The problem is further 
compounded by the fact that Islam and the constitution, 
organization and procedure of sharia courts are state matters, 
which make any enactment of legislation and exercise of executive 
authority on the same outside the purview of the federal legislative 
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and executive authorities respectively. There are undoubtedly 
limitations within the system. Through judicial pronouncements, 
improvement in the law either by way of amendments or enactment 
of new legislation as well as effective enforcement thereof the 
system can be strengthened and improved further.  
[103]  In a dispute over a person’s faith especially when he dies 
often one party who is not a Muslim is involved thus raising the 
question whether the sharia courts have jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. The non-Muslims may not feel comfortable to appear before 
the sharia courts even as witnesses.  On the other hand, the 
determination of the matter before the civil courts is governed by 
strict rules of evidence and procedure, which may prolong the 
proceedings hence a delay in burial of the deceased person. Taking 
into account the fact that apostasy and the issue of a person’s faith 
are sensitive to Muslims and non-Muslims a solution has to be 
found. It is now an appropriate time to consider forming a 
consultative body as an alternative to the sharia courts and civil 
courts to determine the religious status of a deceased person. The 
consultation process shall take the form of private mediation route 
in which a neutral and independent person helps the parties to 
reach a negotiated settlement.  
[104]  It is to be noted that all state enactments relating to the 
administration of sharia law contain provisions on conversion 
including requirement of newly convert to register his conversion 
and the issuance of a certificate to him. To avoid any future dispute 
on the status of his religion especially when the convert dies, a 
provision requiring the convert or the religious authority to notify the 
family of the family of the convert should also be added to these 
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enactments. 
[105]  Generally, there are no provisions on conversion out of Islam 
in state enactments, neither are there any provisions on remedies 
or relief such as injunction and declaration therein. In order to avoid 
any challenge in the future on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on 
the part of the sharia courts to determine the question of conversion, 
clear and adequate provisions should be incorporated into the state 
enactments to confer jurisdiction on the sharia courts.  
[106]  Custody of children and inheritance can be a contentious 
issue in conversion cases involving a spouse of a non-Muslim 
marriage.  One possible solution to this problem is by way of a 
requirement in the law for the converting spouse to fulfill at the time 
of his conversion all his or her obligations and responsibilities under 
the non-Muslim marriage in accordance with the law governing such 
marriage.  
[107]   Our constitutional arrangements have worked well in practise 
but as Malaysia continues to modernize and democratize, more 
practical problems will undoubtedly appear that could cause societal 
tension and threaten to disturb the prevailing harmony between the 
various religious groups.  As a majority-Muslim country, it is 
necessary that Malaysian Muslims should fully understand that 
sharia law is for Muslims only; there’s no legal basis of imposing 
sharia law and Islamic morality on non-Muslim. For the non-Muslim, 
it is also essential they should appreciate of the Muslim rights to be 
governed by sharia law as permissible under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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